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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

BETTY LsSOURD, a woman, ALEX,
T. DAVIES and THELMA DAVIES,
his wife, and VALLEY BANK &
TRUST COMP ANY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
12471

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
All italics are ours and are added for emphasis. The
parties will be referred to as in the Trial Court. "R" refers to Record and "T .R." refers to Transcript of Record in original proceedings and "S.R." refers to Supplemental Record.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action in eminent domain, brought by the
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State of Utah, by and through its Road Commission, to
acquire certain land owned by the defendants for high. I
way purposes. The matter was tried to the Trial Court
on the issues of fair market value for the property taken I
by the State of Utah and the amount of damage, if any,
to the remainder. The Court entered judgment for the
defendant landowners in the sum of $65,990.00 predicated upon a judcial determination that the said defend- j
ants were, at the time of the institution of said action and /
the date of taking, the owners of 6.27 acres from which Il
.42 acre was expropriated in fee. The plaintiff appealed I
from said Judgment and Decree in case # 11866, and on ~
July 23, 1970, this Court entered its Decision as reported
in 24 Utah 2d 383, 472 P.2d 939. The Trial Court there·
after entered Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decree, from which plaintiff takes this ap·
peal.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Civil action Nos. 37 53 and 3736 in the District
Court of Summit County, State of Utah, were consoli·,
dated for purposes of trial; and the Trial Court, predI·
cated upon a determination that the defendant land own·
ers were at the date of taking, the owners of 6.27 acres
'
of real
property, entered Judgment in favor of the sai~
defendant land owners in the sum of $65,990.00. The
plaintiff appealed said Judgment to the Supreme Court
of this State under case No. 11866, contending that the
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Trial Court had erred in its determination of ownership
of the property and had made an erroneous assessment
of severance damages based upon land which the said
defendant land owners did not own as of the date of taking. This Court by Decision of July 23, 1970, decreed
that the defendant landowners were not the owners in
fee of a portion of the property of land in their possession and reversed the case with directions to the trial
judge to eliminate from his Findings and Judgment all
severance damages awarded for the "non-owned land,"
and further directed that if the said trial judge could
not eliminate such from his findings and judgment, that
anew trial should be ordered. Thereafter, the trial judge,
after argument of counsel and deliberation, entered a
Memorandum Decision dated January 25, 1971, concluding that $5,800.00 was the amount awarded for severance damage to the "non-owned land," and after de, ducting the same from the total judgment of $65,990.00,
directed that judgment be entered for the defendant
landowners in the sum of $60,192.00 and, that Amended
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment be
entered in accordance with said Decision.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Amended J udg, ment based upon Amended Findings of Fact Nos. 3, 4,
' 6, 7, 8, 9, and IO and Amended Conclusions of Law No.
3, and asks that a new trial be ordered, or, in the alterna-
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tive, that the Court order entry of Judgment in favor ol
defendants based upon the evidence of plainiff's witness,
Gregory Austin.

STATE.MENT OF FACTS
Insofar as relevant to the issues before this court,
the plaintiff instituted two separate actions to expropri·
ate lands for highway purposes near the intersection o!
U.S. highway 40 and highway U-248 in Summit County,
Utah, as more fully set forth in the Complaints identi·
fied as Civil Nos. 37 53 and 3736.
Defendants were the owners of l.33 acres on the
date of taking, i.e., September 12, 1967,, a portion of
which comprising .37 acre was taken in fee for highway
construction, leaving .96 acre remainder. (Amended
Findings of Fact No. 2.)

On the date of taking, a business consisting of a
garage, servic estation, cafe and small cabins was being
conducted upon the I.33 acres and adjoining "non-owned
land." (T.R. 388, 508, 585, 586; S.R. 11; Def. Exhibit
#31; T.R. 118, 120, 121, 122, Exhibit D-1.)

Preliminary to hearing the issues of damages and
compensation, the Trial Court, after extensive testimon)'
and evidence, ruled as a matter of law, that the defend·
ants were the owners of 6.27 acres at the time of and
prior to condemnation; that 5.85 acres remained after
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taking, and that .42 acre had been expropriated. (T.R.
266, 267.)

Based upon said ruling, expert witnesses predicated
their testimony of values and damages and produced
evidence based upon such ruling. (T.R. 381, 419, 422,
499, 508, 515, 571, 578, 602, 604, Def. Exhibit 31.)
(T.R. 631, 661, 666, 667.)

I

The defendant landowners produced three land
valuation witnesses who testified extensively as to compensation for the taking and damages to the remainder,
and the plaintiff produced one expert witness who testified on such issues. All witnesses utilized the before and
ii after approach.
1

rl

],

'

,
1

The significant testimony of each such witness is as
follows:
Witnesses for defendant landowners:
I. Marcellus Palmer:
"Q. How many acres did this property comprise,
which you appraised?

A. There's 6.27 acres." (T.R. 381.)

***

Q. All right. Now, the reasonable market value you
have put here as $25,000.00. 'Vhich property did you
find was reasonably worth $25,000.00 out of this total
area here, that you capitalized?

A. It was approximately a two acre tract, that takes

5
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in the buildings and improvements." (T.R. 392, 393.)I

***

"Q. You found then-you found that the, under
your testimony, that the value of the land under the in.
come approach was $44,215.00. Tell the Court how you
arrived at that $44,215.00.

A. That was arrived at this way: taking the two
acres that is located underneath the improvements am!
facilities, in my opinion that was worth $12,500.00 an
acre. And that left a remainder of 4.27 acres, and in m1
opinion that was worth 45 hundred per acre. Making a
total of $44,215.00." ( T .R. 399.)

II. Jerome H. Mooney:
"Q. What is the value which you attribute to the
land?

A. $54,000.00.
Q. And further on there you refer to two acres and
four acres. To which property does the two acre refer·

ence refer?

A. The two-plus acres is the property where the im·
provements are situated directly under the improve·
ments. The four-plus would be the remainder of the suo·
ject property.
Q. And what value did you ascribe to the two-acrr

parcel?
6

A. $13,000.00 per acre." (T.R. 508.)
On cross examination this witness further testified
as follows:
"Q. You subscribe two acres of land, I believe, in
your testimony, to the subject development. Did you
survey this to determine the two acres, or how did you
arrive at the two acres?

A. I computed it from the engineer's certificate.
Q. In what manner did you compute it?

A. By putting the subject property on top of the
engineer's survey and measuring the part that was covered, and computing it mathematically.
Q. Now, what distance along the front did you utilize for the subject property?
A. I used a figure of about 650 feet.

Q. About 650 feet?

A. Of 650 feet.
Q. All right. What depth did you allocate to it?
A. 150 feet.
Q. And is that the area that you ascribed to the improvements?

A. Yes.
Q. And the subject development? And have you
multiplied that out to see what acreage it gives you?

7

A. Yes.

}

Q. And what does it give you?

r

A. 97,500 feet." (T.R. 523, 524.)
III. Werner Keipe.

a

"Q. The next step, then, is to, under your, under c
Exhibit 31, is to take out from that $7,800.00 the incom1
that is attributable to the land under the improvementl
is that correct?

A. That's correct.
Q. Why do you want to do that in this capitaliza.
tion approach?

A. The-it is necessary to set up depreciation or
reserve for the recapture of capital in improvementl
Land itself can be capitalized in perpetuity, but improve·
ments have to be appraised as to having a physical eco·
nomic life. And so we separate the two. And this is whal
r ve done here.

Now, the value of $45,500.00 ascribed to land is for
the land which is in the area of the development. It woull
be the area which is below the old road, the old roal
which runs along the upper side of the property. And!
have capitalized that land at 8 %. In other words, I feel
that an investor is entitled to 8 % net on the value of hii
land.***
Q. What part of-how did you arrive at that, ~fr

8

Keipe? Tell us what land you evaluated, at different
rates.

A. I divided the land into three parcels. I ascribed

le1

m

a value of $25,000.00 for this developed commercial,
area; I ascribed a value of $2500.00 per acre for the adjoining land which lies immediately above it; and I ascribed a value of $1,000.00 an acre for this idle land over
here, lying to the west." (T.R. 585, 586.)
On cross examination, this witness further testified
as follows:

:a·

m

"Q. And do you think that the use of this property

beyond the property line, and out in the highway, being
used as a parking, would diminish what a buyer might
pay for the property?
A.No.

~o·
ai

1

'or

Q. So that in your appraisal, you took into account,
in arriving at your value, the fact that this land was available for parking. And I speak now of the land located
out in the highway, in gray.

nii

A. Well, only to the degree in which other cars are
used in other locations on public streets. But this property has a lot of land. And the question of parking is
not an important one, because of the VMt amount of land
which they have unused at the present time." (TR. 776).

[I.

The plaintiff called as an expert witness, Gregory
Austin. This witness significantly based his testimony

)1

1

al

!!

~el
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upon the assumption that there was 1.33 acres of lana
which contributed to the commercial development ana
.42 acre had been expropriated for highway con.~
struction. He further testified that the remaining land
which he referred to as the "back land" had the same
before and after value. (T.R. 631, 632, 666, 667; Plaintiff's Exhibits 33 & 36) .
The witness, Austin, further testified that the sub- ·
ject properties had a before value of $57,000.00 (round·
ed figure) and an after value of $22,500.00, resulting
in a total award of $34,500.00 for the take and damage.
(T.R. 632, 667, 685).
i

The witnesses testifying for the landowners with I
respect to damage and compensation utilized various
combinations of approaches, and their respective tesli·
monies in that regard may be summarized as follows:
The witness Marcellus Palmer, under the income
approach, testified that the property in its before con·
dition had a value of $89,671.00. (T.R. 399.) By hii
"cost replacement approach," he testified that the prop·
erty in its before condition had a total value of $93,·
167.00. (T.R. 402).
The witness further testified that he placed primary
emphasis upon the income approach and determined
the fair market value of the property in its before con·
dition to be $89,700.00. (T.R. 402), and that the total
value of the land and improvements in the after con·
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I dition was $9,809.00 (T.R. 418, Defendants' Exhibit
thereby ascribing a difference between the be, fore and after value of $79,900.00 as the amount to be
awarded as compensation for the taking and severance
, damage ( T .R. 422, 423).
I #24-A)

The defendants called as their second expert witness Mr. Jerome H. Mooney, who testified that the
fair market value of the subject property on the date
of taking, in the before condition, was $92,349.00 (T.R.
,512, Defendants' Exhibit #29).
The witness further testified that in his opinion the
fair market value of the property in the after condition
was $9,341.00 (T.R. 516), resulting in a total difference for take and severance of $83,008.00 (T.R. 521,
Defendants' Exhibit #29).
The third expert witness called by the defendant
landowners was Werner Keipe, who testified that in
his opinion the fair market value of the subject properties in the before condition and as of the date of taking
was the sum of $90,000.00 ( T .R. 594, Defendants'
Exhibit #31).
The witness further testified that the value of the
subject properties in the after condition on the date of
taking was the sum of $11,600.00 (T.R. 601, Defendants' Exhibit #31-A), giving a difference in the before
and after value of $78,400.00. (T.R. 604, Defendants'
Exhibit #31-B).
11

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial jud~I
entered judgment in favor of the defendant landowneN!
and against the plaintiff in the principal sum of $65,.
992.00, computed in the following manner:
(a) Fair market value of 6.27 acres
before condemnation ................................ $80,70U
(b) Fair market value of remainder
5.85 acres after condemnation ................ $14,709.0~
I

TOTAL DAMAGES ............................$65,992.001

Following the decision of this court in case no. 1186~.
the case was remanded to the trial judge with instruc·
tions to eliminate from his Findings and Judgment ~
severance damages awarded for the "non-owned land"i
if he could do so; otherwise, a new trial was ordered
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated April
1969, Decision in case no. 11866, Utah Supreme Court).

I

After additional argument of counsel, the trial
court ordered the entry of Amended Findings of Fae!,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, wherein the said
trial court found as follows:
(a) Fair market value of the total
tract of 1.33 acres in the before condition $70,821.0~
(b) Fair market value of the remaider
.97 (sic. 96) acre remaining after condemnation .................................................. $10,629.0~
TOTAL AWARD FOR DAMAGE
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AND TAKING ....................................$60,192.00
(Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment, dated March 1971)

POINTS
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT SEVERANCE DAMAGES TO
THE "NON-OWNED" LAND COULD BE
ELIMINATED FROM THE FINDINGS AND
JUDGMENT.
POINT II. THAT DEFENDANT LANDOWNERS HAVE FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE
BURDEN OF PROOF RELATIVE TO COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES CAUSED BY
THE TAKING.

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT SEVERANCE DAMAGES TO
THE "NON-OWNED" LAND COULD BE
ELIMINATED FROM THE FINDINGS AND
JUDGMENT.
In view of the trial court's ruling that the defendant

land owners were the owners of 6.27 acres of real prop13

erty in the before condition, the three expert witnes~e c
called by the defendants based their before and aftt 1
values upon that particular ownership. Of great sii t
nificance is the fact that each of the defendants' exper
witnesses concluded and testified that in their opinio1
there was in excess of 1.33 acres of land devoted ani I
used for the commercial development located upon tn1
premises. In this regard, the witness, Keipe, testifo <
that in his opinion 1.82 acres were devoted to the com i
mercial development. The witness, :Marcellus Palmer
testified that in his opinion two acres were devoted 1,
the commercial development, and the witness, J erorn1
H. Mooney, testified that in his opinion a little mon
than two acres were devoted to the commercial develo~
ment. All of these assumptions were contrary to tn1
law announced by this court in its decision in case no
11866. The only witness who testified with respect !1
the true acreage was the witness of the plaintiff, M1 '
Gregory Austin, who utilized a total acreage of U ·
as the basis for the commercial development. The 11
spective significant testimonies referred to are set fortt
in the Statement of Facts heretofore.

J

'Ve are now confronted with the problem o
determining what credence can be given to the tes~
mony of those witnesses who predicated their exper
opinion evidence, and testimony upon an erroneoui
assumption of fact and law. It is the contention of tf:
laintiff that such evidence and testimony must fall~·
P
• n
a matter of law, and by reason thereof, there is ·

14

~e credible evidence of any probative value before the court
lt upon (which) a Finding of Fact can be based to support
ii the Judgment and award made by the trial court.

er

In the landmark case of United States vs. Honnni [ulu Plantation Company, 182 Fed. 2d 172 (9th Circuit
11 1950) , the Court there addressed itself to the matter
1~ of expert testimony based upon erroneous assumptions
m· and noted:
01

er

]t

)~

li

"Where unwarranted theories of law or assumptions of fact guide the expert and are used as a
basis for value by the Court, the evaluation will
be set aside and cause remanded for new Findings."

In the case of State of Washington vs. United States,
11 214 Fed. 2d 33 (9th Circuit 1954), there existed a disfr crepancy between the physical facts and the opinion
~ of the expert witness. In that case, the Court observed
r1 that:

10

:tt

i~

er

"Opinion evid~nce is only .a~ go~ as th~ facts
upon which it is based. Opn~10n evidence m c~n
flict with physical facts, U mted States vs. Hill,
8th Cir., 1933, 62 Fed. 2d 1022; United States
vs. Thornburgh,sth Cir., 1940, lll Fed. 2d 2~8,
280, is not substantial evidence and may be disregarded."
"***Evidence contradicted by the physical facts
is entitled to no credence." (Numerous authorities cited.)
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Although the Washington case, supra, is dea\inc
with a conflict between physical facts and expe;
opinions, we see no difference between that situatio:
and one where there is a conflict between a princip\i
of law and expert opinion. Thus, it would seem to wi
that if the expert opinion testimony is in direct conili1:
with a legal concept or principle, then and in that event
the testimony would be entitled to no credence what!
soever under the authorities set forth.
I
A further case of significance is the case of 681&:
acres of land, etc., Rio Arriba Co., N. M. vs. Unit~
States, 411 Fed. 2d 834 (10th Cir. 1969) which sef
forth the following:
"To have probative value, expert opinion mm
be 'founded upon substantial data, not mere cm
jecture, speculation or unwarranted assumptim
It must have a rational foundation.' United Stalt
vs. Sowards, 370 Fed. 2d 87, 92 (10th Cir. 1960!
Here the government experts relied on erroneou
legal. assumptions, made no attempt to. s~eci~
the kmd of benefit contemplated or to hm1t n1
amount of acreage to be benefited. Surely thee1
tire 26,000 remaining acres will not be useful 11i
lakeshore development and will not be benefit~
Yet, the government experts did not explain tb1
gross valuation or denominate the extent of~
benefit in any way. Obviously, such 'speculati;i
and remote possibilities cannot become a gU11
for the ascertainment of value in judicial asct:
tainment of the truth.'" (Authorities cited.)
1

In the case of United States vs. 102.93 acres'
16

n1 land, 154 Fed. Supp. 258 (United States District Court,
ir New York, July 1957) the Court said:

"* * * Opinion

I

1at

1
I

evidence is only as good as the
facts upon which it is based. ' ' ' Where unwarranted theories of law or assumptions of fact
guide the experts and are used as a basis for value
by the Court, the valuation will be set aside and
the cause remanded for new Findinus." (Authorities cited.) (Emphasis added.)

The Supreme Court of California in the case of
o.: Metropolitan Water District vs. Adams, 116 P.2d 7,
t~ quoting from the case of City of Stockton vs. Billing~·, wood, 96 Ca1. App. at Page 722, said:
i

:or

im

1\t
10!

·ou

ci~

I

H1
e1

111

w
I

hf]

"The rule which requires the rejection of testimony evaluating remote, conjectural, speculative,
and hypothetical uses and elements is of long
standing."

"* * * \Vhere a witness testifying as to value,
bases his opinion entirely upon incompetent and
inadmissable matters, or shows that such matters
are cheap elements in the calculations which lead
to his conclusion, his testimony should be rejected.
This applies with great force where the opinion
is based upon pure speculation. * * *"

I

~

In the case of State Highway Commission vs.
~;i Central Paving Co., 399 P.2d 1019, 240 Oregon 71, the
;cf Court in discussing the credibility of testimony based
in part on an element improperly employed stated:
~S'

"*

* * However,

if the estimate is based in part

17

upon an element improperly employed, the esh, 11
is not. competent evidence and the Stateti6
entitled to mquire as to the value attributed ti j'
the improperly employed element for the pur .i
pose of reducing the estimate by that amount, 01 m
if it cannot be segregated, to insist that the wit. w
ness's estimate be stricken. Therefore, the judK UJ
ment must be reversed and the cause remande( f
f
. l"
f or a new tria
.

ma~e

oJ

See also: United States vs. Cooper (5th Cir. 196ij1lr
277 Fed. 2d 857; International Paper Co. vs. Unite,,u1
States, 227 Fed. 2d 201 (5th Cir. 1955).
·1''1

'fc

In the case of United States vs. Smith, 355 F.i~ tr
807 (5th Cir. 1966), the trial court permitted a witnfl! !1
to utilize Option Agreements as comparable sales t1 in
support his testimony, which the Appellate Court heli le
to be error ; and in reversing the trial court and orderi~ P
a new trial, the court said:

1

"* * * Without that testimony the amount of tn1 d1
verdict was much above the range of the com ai
petent evidence of the expert witnesses and of t11
comparable transactions which were in evidencf m
Under these circumstances it would be impossibl1 to
to say that the jury did not base its verdict, i ei
least in part, upon Williamson's incompeten w
t~stimony. It foll~ws that t?e Gov~rnmen~ is efr ol
titled to a new tnal at which the Jury will haf
only competent evidence of market value befor
it."
\V

Each of the expert witnesses of the def endan di
landowners predicated their testimony upon unwar

18

sh, ranted assumptions of fact and law, i.e., that there existed

~ti 6.27 acres of land in the original tract owned by the deli J'endant landowners at the time of and prior to the tak: ing, and that of said amount approximately two acres
vii· were devoted to the commercial development located
lK upon the premises, when in truth and in fact the said dele( fendant landowners were the owners of only 1.33 acres
of land, and the subject improvements were located, by
rn the testimony of the defendants' witnesses, not only
tel, upon the 1.33 acres of land but upon the adjoining
i ''non-owned" properties. Considered in the light of the
'foregoing authorities, it seems patently clear to us that
.i~ the assumptions made by these witnesses leave their
.el! testimony without any probative value or foundation
t1 in fact, and in any event, would not support a finding
eli for Judgment in the amount found to be due as comi~ pensation for the taking and damages sustained.
1

If the testimony of the expert witnesses for the

tni defendant landowners was in fact unworthy of belief
ili and not entitled to stand as credible evidence or testitcf mony, then and in that event there would be no basis
.bl1 to support the Findings of the trial court, save and
1 except the testimony of the State's witness which sum
en was far less than the amount awarded by the Judgment
e&
af of the trial court.
or

It seems patently clear that there is no way by
an which the court, under the present posture of the evidence and testimonv can now segregate the severance

t

J '
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damages from the "non-owned land." The entire testi.
many of the expert witnesses for the defendant land.
owners is so interwoven and founded upon a unit at
6.27 acres, and unwarranted assumptions of law ano
fact, that it defies any reasonable segregation of the
non-owned land. 'Vithout the opportunity to examine
the witnesses based upon the true ownership, it seem~
that the plaintiff would be severly prejudiced by any
Judgment of the trial court, except a Judgment predi.
cated solely upon the evidence and testimony eliciteo
from the State's witness Gregory Austin, the only wit·
ness who utilized the true acreage of 1.33 acres anu
ascribed no difference to the non-owned land in the
before and after condition.

POINT II. THAT DEFENDANT LANDOWN·
ERS HAVE FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE
BURDEN OF PROOF RELATIVE TO COM·
PENSATION AND DAMAGES CAUSED EY
THE TAKING.

.I

The rule of law is well established in this jurisd1c·
tion that in an action in eminent domain the landowner
has the burden of proof to establish, by competen1
1
evidence, his right to compensation for taking an~!
severance damages, if any. See: Tanner vs. Proru
Bench Canal and Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 P
584 (1911); People vs. Thomas, 239 P.2d 914 (Call
1952); State of Idaho vs. Dunclick, 286 P.2d lll!i
20

. (1955); State vs. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 366 P.2d
. 76 (1961); Utah Road Commission vs. Hanson, 14
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Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917 (1963).

In the case of United States of America vs. Sowards,
370 Fed. 2d 87 (10th Cir. 1966), the Court said:

"* * * The burden rests upon the owner to establish by competent evidence his right to substantial
compensation." (Cages and authorities cited.)
"Qualified and knowledgable witnesses may give
their opinion or estimate of the value of the property taken, but to have probative value, that opinion or estimate must be founded upon substantial
data, not mere conjecture, speculation, or unwarranted assumption. It must have a rational foundation." (Authorities cited.) (Emphasis added.)
Of similar import is the case of United States vs.

~·

765.56 acres of land, 164 Fed. Supp. 942 (United States

E District Court of New York, July 1958) where the
1!· court said:
y
"* * * It appears clear from his testimony that
his appraisals and estimates of damage are largely, if not entirely, based upon unwarranted and
IC·
unjustified theories of law and assumptions of
1€!
fact and, as such must be completely rejected by
the court." (Authorities cited.)
"The burden of proof rested upon the owners and
not upon the government to establish the damage
sustained as a result of the easement taken, by a
fair preponderance of the evidence, and upon
opinion having a rational foundation." (Authorities cited.)
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It is the position of the plaintiff that the testimony
of the expert witnesses for the defendant landowner1
have predicated their entire testimony upon unwar.
ranted assumptions of law and fact. Therefore, the
entire testimony must fail and be totally rejected b)
the trial court. The landowners having failed to sustain
the burden of proof, the only alternative is for the trial
court to enter judgment for the defendant landownen
predicated upon the testimony and evidence of the I
State's witness, or in the alternative, order a new trial 1
based upon a reappraisal of the property founded upon I
the correct ownership of the properties involved in the 1
subject actions.
I

In the Memorandum Decision of January 25, 1971,
the trial court referred to the testimony of the State'1
appraiser, Gregory Austin, to support its finding that
$5,800.00 was the amount awarded for severance damage to the "non-owned" land. The trial court further
observed that said witness determined that the "non·
owned" land was worth $2,000.00 per acre in both the
before and after condition. Mr. Austin was the om~
witness to approach the appraisal of the subject prop·
erty in this manner. The crux of the problem lies in
the fact that there was no evidence or testimony to
support the judgment of $60,192.00 without utilizini
the testimony of expert witnesses for the defendants.
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When we consider that the testimonies of these I
1
witnesses were founded on unwarranted assumptioDI
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the burden of proof placed upon the defendants has not
r1 been met, and the sole credible testimony of any pror· bative value is that of the State's witness.
he
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CONCLUSION
In essence, it is the position of the plaintiff, that

by virtue of the trial court's erroneous ruling with
respect to the true ownership of the lands in question,
the plaintiff and the court were thereby deprived of the
opportunity, on cross examination, of determining and
testing the reasoning, method and amount for severance
damages attributed to any "non-owned" land in excess
r1 of 1.33 acres. It is significant to note that the expert
e'1 witnesses for defendants based their testimony upon the
at erroneous assumption that at least 1.82 acres of the
1
11• subject property devoted to a commercial development
ier was owned by the defendants, and the greatest damage
in· was assigned to the commercial area. It would be of
he great interest to know what these witnesses would have
U\ testified to had their testimony been confined to the
true ownership of 1.33 acres. Each of them testified
in to the effect, that although only 1.82 acres or two acres
to of the subject property was devoted to the commercial
ni development, nevertheless, the fact that the landowners
1. natl access to a remaining larger tract would, in their
opinion, substantially lend itself to a development of the
~e property into a larger operation. To what extent this
01 rnav have influenced their overall appraisal can only
1

;.
1
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be the subject of pure speculation and conjecture at
this time. However, in view of the trial court's erroneou1
ruling with respect to the ownership, there is no logical
or feasible method by which the severance damage!
attributed by defendant's witnesses can now be allocatea
to the 1.33 acres of owned land and separated from th1
"non-owned" land.
It is the plaintiff's position that the burden o!
proof has not been sustained by defendants by reasou
of the unsupported and unfounded testimony of theil
expert witnesses. This being so, the trial court is then
left with only one source of credible evidence for ib
consideration in a determination of the issues involvea,
i.e., the testimony of Gregory Austin, appraiser for th1
plaintiff. With this testimony being the sole credibl<
evidence for the court to consider, we respectfully submit
that there is no logical basis upon which the trial court
could predicate an appropriate Finding of Fact ano
Judgment, save and except one based upon the testi·
mony of said witness. Accordingly, we contend that
the only judgment which could be entered by the trial
court would have to be founded upon the testimony ol
such witness, or that a new trial be ordered.

Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
24

State of Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
By: Brant H. Wall
Special Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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the fore Brief of Appellant was mailed to Robert S.
Campbell, Jr., at 400 El Paso Gas Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah, Attorney for Defendants and Respondents,
on the ................ day of July, 1971.

25

